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SITUATION

II.

A United States auxiliary collier commanded by an
officer appointed by the Secretary of theN avy is in a harbor of State X. The collier collides with and injures a
foreign vessel. The owner of the foreign vessel brings
suit against the commander of the collier for damages
under the civil law, claiming that the status of the collier
is uncertain, and that the commander \vould in any case
be liable as would the co1nmander of a ship of StateX,
the commanders of whose vessels, public and private, are
liable in the civil courts of that state under simila1· circumstances.
'Vhat position should the senior officer of the l7nited
States take?
SOLUTION.

The senior officer. acting in a<;cordance with principle,
precedent, and regulations, should appoint a board of inquiry and maintain that the suit should not be brought
against the 1naster of the auxiliary collier, but that the
elai1ns should be referred to the United States Government through eli ploma tic channels.
~OTES
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SITC~-\TIO~

II.

Gene1·al.-In this situation the o'Yner of the injured
foreign Yessel clain1s that the status of a United States
auxiliary collier is uncertain. He also clain1s that e,~en
if the collier 'Yas recognized as a public Yessel it 'Youlcl be
liable·to the s~une treatment as do1nestic public Yessels under si1nilar circun1stances and that the collier could therefore be made the defendant in r·em or its conunancler the
defendant in persono1n in a :-:nit for da1nage.s resulting
from a collision.
Claims against public Yessels and property in foreign
ports ha Ye been n1ade in Yarion~ fonu~. 'rhese clai1ns
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haYe involved property rights, salv·age and other serYice~
collisions. and in general such 1natters as could properly
be subject to national ·court jurisdict~on.
Prope1'ty right8 against a foreign war vessel.-In 1812
Chief Justice )lar~ha ll delivered the opinion in the celebrated case of the Schooner Exchange v. l\f'Fa<ldon.
T'his case inYolYecl the Ycry delicate and important inquiry. \Yhether an ~\tnrrican citizPn can assert, in an
~\n1erican court. property rights against a foreign national Yes~el. The learned Chief .Jnstice laid down the
fundntnental prinri pieThe jurisdiction of the courts is a branch of that possessed by
the nation as an independent soYereign vower.
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusiYe and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation
not imposed by itself. Any restrictions upon it, deriYing Yalidity
from an external source. ''"ould imply a dimiuntion of its soYereignt~- to the extent of the restriction, and an inYestment of that
soYC>rei~nty to the ~amP exte~1t in tlwt uqwer which could impose
such re~triction.
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and con1plete po"·er of a
na tiou within its O\Yll territories mnst he traced up to the consent
of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate
source.
The consent may be either express vr implied. In the latter
case it is less determinate, exposed more to the uncertainties of
construction, but, if understood, not less obligatory.
The world being composed of distinct soYereignties, possessing
equal rights and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted by intercourse with each other, and by an intrecharige of
those good offices which humanity dictates and its wants require,
nll soYereigns lla Ye consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases
under certain peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and complete jurisdiction within their respect h·~ territories which soYereignty confers.

After a full discussion o£ \Tarious fonns o£ imtnunity,
the decision continues:
It seems, then, to the court to be a principle of public law, that
national ships of war, entering the port of a friendly power open
for their reception, are to be considered as exem11ted by the consent of that 11ower from its juri~diction.,
Without doubt the so,·ereign of the place is capable of destroying this implication. He may claim and exercise jurisdiction
either by employing force or by subjecting such Yessels to the or-
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dinary tribunals. But until such power be exerted in a manner
not to be misunderstood, the sovereign cannot be considered as
having imparted to the ordinary tribunals a jurisdiction which
it would be a breach of faith to exercise. Those general statutory
provisions, therefore, which are descriptive of the ordinary jurisdiction of the judicial tribunals, wllich give an individual, who~e
property has been wrested from him, a right to claim that property
in the courts of the country in which it is found, ought not, in the
opinion of this court, to be so construed as to give them jurisdiction in a case in which the sovereign power has impliedly consented to waive its jurisdiction .
The arguments in favor of this opinion which have been drawn
from the general inability of the judicial power to enforce its decisions in cases of this description, from the consideration that the
sovereign power of the nation is alone competent to avenge wrongs
committed by a sovereign, that t he questions to which such wrongs
give birth are rather questions of poljcy than of law, that they are
for diplomatic rather than legal discussion, are of great weight,
and merit serious attention. ( 7 Cranch, "C. S. Supreme Court Reports, 116.)

Salcage and fo reign waT i)essels.-Sir \~Villiam Scott.
in 1820~ in a suit £or salvage against the Prins Frede1·ilc,
said:
I think that the first applica tion for a recon1peuse in the nature
of sa 1ntge, ougllt, in the case of n sllip of \var helongiv;; to a for·
eign state, to have been made to the re})resentative of that state
resident in tllis c-ountry. In the present case no doubt can be entertained that just atte11tion would have been paid to the application,
and clue care taken, after proper information obtained, to have
answered the claim in son1e form or other, as substantial justice
might ~een1 to re(}nire; for it is uot reasonable to suppose that
prinite indiYidrals iu tllis coun try should go unrewarded for
SE-rYices rendereu to ships of foreign governments when they
\vould have been liberally rewarded for similar services performed
for such ships belonging to their O\YB. (2 Dodson's Admiralty
Reports, 451, 484.)

In the case of the United States frigate Constitution,
carrying 1nachinery, etc., £rom the Paris Exposition,
stranded on Ballard Point, England, in 1879, and against
·which suit was brought for salvage by owner of steam
tug which pulled Constitution off, Sir Robert Phillimore
said:
There is no doubt as to the general proposition that ships of
war belongirig to a nation with whom this country is at peace
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are exempt fron1 the civil jurisdiction of this country. I have
listened in vain for any peculiar circumstances to take this case
out of that general provosition. It has happened to me more than
once, since I have had the honour of sitting in this chair, to have
been requested by foreign states to sit as arbitrator and to make
an a ward in cases-one of collision and two of salvage. If a
similar request had been made to the court in this case, I would
gladly have undertaken the duty sought to be imposed upon it;
but I have now only to consider whether there is an~· authority
for the proposition that when a foreign state refuses to waive the
privilege which it posses~es it is competent to this court, nevertheless, to treat it as an individual and serve civil process on its
vroperty. I ani clearly of the opinion that it would be very
wrong and inl}H'oper in n1e to assent to this application on the
part of the owner of the steam tug. ( 4 Law Reports. Probate
Division, 39.)

This decision denies the right of a British citizen to
con1pel payment by a public vessel for services rendered
when the vessel "·as in great need.
Lllilitary supplies belonging to a foJ·eign sovc7'fign.In the ca~e of \T a vasseur 1'. l(rupp the question of jurisdiction over the property of a foreign soYereign was
raised. The foreign soYereign involved 'vas the E1nperor
of Japan. The case "·as brought in England and is suinmarized as follo"·s :
A foreign sovereign bought in Gennany shells made there, but
said to be infringements of an English patent. r_rhey were brought
to this country in order to be put on board a ship of war belonging to the foreign sovereign, and the l)atentee obtained an injunction against the agents of the foreign sovereign and the persons
in whose custody the shells were, restraining then1 from remodng
the shells. The foreign sovereign then applied to be and was made
a defendant to the suit. An order was then made up by the master of the rolls, and approved on appeal, that notwithstanding the
injunction he should be at liberty to remove the shells.

In 1877 the British court gave the opinion that property of a foreign sovereign in Great Britain could not. be
held, saying of the Chancery Division of the High Court
of JusticeThis court has no jurisdiction, and, in my opinion, none of the
courts in this country have any jurisdiction, to interfere with the
JU'Opert~· of a foreign sovereign, nwre (•specia1ly with what we call
the public vroperty of the state of which he is soverign as distin-
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guished from tba t which n1ay be his own private property. The
courts ha Ye no jurisdiction to do so, not only because there is no
jurisdiction as against the individual, but because there is no
jurisdiction as against the foreign country whose property they
are, although that foreign country is represented, as all foreign
countries haYing a soYereign are represented, by the individual
who is the soYereign. (Law Reports, 9 Chancery Division, 351.)

Domestic regulations as to foreign war vessels in time
of peace.-The attempt to regulate in some detail the entrance and sojourn of foreign public vessels has been
made by several states. States having large navies have
not generally made many reg~lations. Public vessels are
required to respect police, quarantine, sanitary, fiscal, and
harbor regulations.
Article 11 of the Netherlands royal decree of February
2, 1893, providedthat foreign ships and vessels of war shall respect the existing
pclice, sanitary, and fiscal laws and regulations, and shall further
submit to all rules and regulations of the port, in both cases to the
same extent a~ is de111anded of the na tiona] ships and vessels of
war. (~ )Joore, International Law Digest, 593.)

Regulations so1newhat siinilar in scope are in force in
other states.
In the second volu1ne of Professor Moore's monumental
and most valuable work, "A Digest of International
Law·~" there appears a letter from the Secretary of State
to the Secretary of the Navy in regard to the attitude of
the United States to\vard such regulations as above mentioned:
I haYe the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the letter from
your Department, dated the 9th of August last, inclosing for an
expression of this Department's views in the matter a copy of a
letter from the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation of the Navy
Department, with inclosures, relatiYe to the propriety and feasibility of issuing an order to naval vessels directing that when
pilots are not employed local foreign Jaws requiring the employment of pilots are not to be held to compel the payment of pilotage by public vessels.
In reply I have the honor to say that the laws of some of our
States require the payment of pilotage fees when pilots are not
employed, and these Jaws, by their terms, apply· to an vessels.

28

AUXILIARY COLLIER IN FOREIGN HARBOR.

The doctrine of international law is that all -vessels are subject
to the re-venue and police regulations, including those in regard to
pilotage. of the territorial waters 'Yhich such Yessels may enter.
In the statement of the doctrine no exception is made in favor of
public Yessels.
In ~ecretary Chandler's letter of July 12, 1884, inclosed in yours,
the statement is made that certain exemptions are allowed by
international law to public vessels; and in Secretary Frelinghuysens letter, also inclosed with yours, the same statement is
made. Xo authorities are cited in support of the proposition,
while the doctrine abo-ve mentioned is stated in Lawrence, International La·w, pages 223 and 22G; Hall, International Law, page
192: rradier-Fodere, International Law, section 237!>.
The latter says that "the ports, the roadsteads, the harbors
form a dependency of the national public domain, and the ships
of foreign nations are under the obligation to obser-ve rigorously
the general and special regulations in force in the harbors, roadsteads, and ports."
In Yiew of the foregoing the Department could not adYise the
adoption of the rule suggested. (Page 583.)

Regulations in regard to the sojourn in tirr1e of peace o:f
war vessels of a foreign power within the territorial waters of a given state n1ay be and have been 1nade. The
regulations most frequently have regard to police and
quarantine .
.A. royal decree of February 18. 1901~ regulates in considerable detail the ad1nission of foreign 1nen-of-war to
the harbors of Belgi un1.
Leopold II, King of the Belgians, to all present and to come,
greetings:
Considering that the time is opportune to regulate, in conformity with international law and the obligations of perpetual neutrality, the admission of foreign men-of-war in the waters and
harbors of Belgium;
On the proposition of our ~Iinisters of Foreign Affairs, of War,
and of Railways, Posts, and Telegraphs,
e ha Ye ordered and order :

"r

GE~ERAL

DISPOSITIOXS IN

TI~IE

OF PEACE.

ARTICLE I. In time of peace war Yessels belonging to foreign
powers may enter freely Belgian harbors of the ~orth Sea and
anchor off said waters within territorial waters. provided that

BELGIAN REGULATIONS.
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the number of such yessels flying the same flag, including those
already within that zone or in harbor, does not exceed three.
ARTICLE II. :F'oreign n1en-of-war may not enter the Belgian
waters of the Scheidt, anchor in the roads of Antwerp, nor penetr·ate within the inland waters of the Kingdom without first obtailling the authorization of the minister of foreign affairs.
This authorization shall be asked through the medium of the
snbinspector of Belgian pilotage at Flushing.
ARTICLE III. Foreign men-of-wa:r;,. unless especially authorized
by the GoYernment, may not remain longer than two weeks in the
Belgian territorial waters and harbors.
They are required to put to sea within six hours when requested
to do so by the navy administration or the territorial military
n uthorities, even should the time fixed for their stay not have
expired.
ARTICLE IV. Should peculiar circun1stanees demand it, the Government reserYes· the right to modify the aboYe restrictions to the
entrance or stay of foreign men-of-war in Belgian waters and
harbors.
ARTICLE V. The dispositions of Articles I, II, and III do not
apply to men-of-war whose admission has been authorized through
diplomatic channels, nor to Yessels on board of which happen to
be either a chief of state, a prince of a reigning dynasty, or a
diplomatic agent accredited near the King or GoYernment.
ARTICLE VI. Foreign men-of-war in Belgian waters are prohibited from making sketches or taking soundings, as well as from
engaging in landing or firing exercises.
:Members of the crew should be without arms when on shore.
Commissioned and noncommissioned officers may carry the arms
which form a part of their un~forms.
Boats plying in the harbors and territorial waters must not be
armed.
Should funeral honors be giYen on shore, an exemption to paragraph 2 of the present article may be authorized by the minister
of war on request of the territorial military authorities.
ARTICLE VII. Captains of foreign men-of-war at·e required to
observe the laws and regulations concerning the police, public
health, taxes, and imposts, unless exceptions be established by
particular conYention or by international usages.

Status of public vessels other than war vessels.-From
the decisions and regulations it would seem to be established that a public vessel o:f war would not be liable to
the jurisdiction o:f a local court.
There are, however, many vessels engaged in such service as may giYe rise to questions in regard to exen1ption.
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These Yessels may be engaged in transport, 1nail, telegraph, collier, or other service for the govenunent of a
state and under state control.
Opinions upon the status of such vessels have gradually
becon1e 1nore clearly defined.
Status of a troopship.-In March, 1842, the Athol, a
British troopship, ran do\vn and sunk the British Shipping Co1npany's brig Jane OZark. Application was made
to recover for the loss.
Doctor Lushington gives his opinion in the case:
X ow the first consideration which occurs is this, viz: How far ..
could I enforce the execution of the process if it should be granted
and resisted? 'l'his is an important point to be considered, in the
first instance, in all cases of this kind, inasn1uch as it would, I
conceiYe, be a Yer;r imprudent and scarcely a befitting attempt in
any conrt to issue a process which it could not enforce, and which,
if resisted, must terminate in a defeat of the authority of the
cc·urt. In applying this consideration to the present case the following difficulties suggest themseh·es as conclusiYe of the question
which I am now called upon to determine: In the first place, I
feel tba t I could not enforce the monition if the lords of the Admiralty should refuse to appear; and secondly, assuming that an
appearance should be giYen on their behalf, and it should be found
that the damage in question was occasioned by the fault of th·~
troopship, the Athol, or those on board her, I could not enforce
the payment of that damage as against the lords of the Admiralty
under the circumstances of this case. But there are also other
considerations which induce me to refuse this application. As far
af, my OY\rn experience extends in the practice of this court, I am
Eot aware of any case in which a similar process has been issued;
on the contrary, in a case which was deci9-ed by Lord Stowell,
and which is the only case that I can recollect in any degree approaching to the circumstances of this case, Lord Stowell expressly refused to issue any monition upon the ground that "he
was satisfied that the lords commissioners of the Admiralty would
be disposed to do justice upon being convinced that wrong had
been done, and that the occurrence complained of had actually
taken place." (1 Robinson's Admiralty Reports, 374.)

Status of a public mail vessel.-The Parlement Belge,
a vessel belonging to the l(ing of the Belgians, unanned
and carrying mails, collided with a private British vessel,
the Daring. In the Court of Appeal in 1880 it was held,
reversing the decision of the Admiralty Division:
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As a consequence of the absolute independence of every sovereign authority and of the international comity which induces every
sovereign state to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, each and every one declines to exercise by means of
any of its courts any of its territorial jurisdiction over the person
of any sovereign or ambassador of any other state, or over the
public property of any state which is destined to public use, or
over the property of any ambassador, though such sovereign, ambassador, or property be within its territory, and therefore, but
for the common agreement, subject to its jurisdiction.

In the san1e case it 'vas also heldthat an unarmed packet belonging to the sovereign of a foreign
state, and in the hands of officers commissioned by him, and employed in carrying mails, is not liable to be seized in a suit in rem
to recover redress for a collision, and this immunity is not lost
by reason of the packet's also carrying merchandise and passengers for hire. (5 Law Reports, Probate Division, 197.)

Liability for pilotage.-In the case of Symons v. Baker
(I(. B. Div., Aug. 4, 1905), the J{harki, a coal vessel
owned by His ~Iajesty's Govern1nent, was involved. The
f{harki "\"Vas a "collier exclusively engaged in going back\rards and forwards to various ports, carrying coal for
the navy." She flew· the Devonport Dockyard flag, but
not the navy flag. She appears in the Navy List under
the heading, "List of small steam vessels, tugs, etc., employed on harbor service." Her n1aster held a board of
trade certificate issued by the dockyard authorities at
Devonport and acted on instructions received from the
coaling officer at Devonport Dockyard. "He is not an
officer of. the royal navy. The cre'v of the vessel were
engaged at the dockyard under articles of agreement."
It 'vas claimed that the Inaster of such a vessel 'vas liable
to pilotage dues and that the vessel was used for " commercial purposes."
·
Lord Chief Justice Alverstone, in granting an appeal,
said of the claim that the J{harki was used for" commercial purposes."
'
I thin]} there was nothing commercial about this. I think the
facts show, and the learned magistrate does not differ from that,
that the Kharki was being employed as what may be called a coal
tender, and solely as a tender taking coal to the ships of the navy.
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Therefore, unless some distinction can be drawn between one of
His l\lajesty's ships performing a more dignified sen·ice and one
which was verforming, as this Yessel was, a most useful but less
dignified sen·ice, I do not understand the distinction of ''commercial purposes.''

N o"J' the Yessel in question is clearly a I\:ing~s ship; that
is to say, she co1nes within the words of section 741 of the
-~Ierchant Shipping Act, which are, "shall not, except as
expressly provided, apply to ships belonging to I-lis
~fajesty." Of the clain1 that the master of the J{llar!Li
would be liable because he ordered the pilotage~ it "~as
said, "He [the master] is the rnaster of the J(ing-'s ship;
he acts as n1aster in behalf of the Crown : he is an· agent
in the ordinary sense of the word.'~ The rmnedy ·would
be by petition of right for the amount of clain1. X either
ship or 1naster could be proceeded against. (X, .t\.sp.
l\far. La1r ~ Cas. 129.)
ColUsion of public and prvl/v at( 't'usscls of dijj'£r£nt
States.-In 1883 the }!exican gunboat lndependencia ran
down the . .-\...n1erican schooner Dayligltt. .A dispatch fron1
l\fr. I~.,relinghuysen, Secretary of State. to "Jlr. "Jiorgan,
minister to ~fexico. show~ th e nttitnde of the 1... nited
States at that period:
.JI r. Frelin g h uyfi en

U 1 JjJ r ..M orpa n.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

lVashington , Noventber 15, 1883.
SrR: Your dispatch, Xo. 690, of the 21st September, in relation
to the claim of Capt. Fred. L . Blair ~ of the American schooner
Daylight, bas been received.
The note of the 18th of September addressed to you by )Jr. Ferllandez, a covy of which accompanies your dispatch. bas been carefully considered. I regret to find that the inquiry made in my
instruction of the 24th of ~larch last (No. 382) ~ and which it is
perceived you submitted to l\1r. Fernandez, bas not. as I conceive,
been explicitly answered by the :Mexican Government. If liability
to the party injured attaches as a result of the lndependencia's
action in running down the .American schooner, such liability is
imputable, not to the commander of the gunboat, but to the ~Iexi
can Government. If 1\Ir. Fernandez is to be understood .as saying
that an American citizen may, in such a case, maintain legal proceedings for the recovery of the damages thus claimed directly
against the Government of ~IexiC'(l in the court~ 0f that Hepublir.
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I have only to observe that I have not heretofore understood that,
under the laws of 1\fexico, the Government of that country might
be sued in its own courts either by a citizen of the Republic or a
foreigner, without special permission having first been ~iven for
that purpose, and before I could consent to submit the claimant
in the present case to the expense and delay of such a proceeding
it is desirable that I should be exactly informed on that point.
In l\Ir. 1\Iariscal's note to you of the 3d of ~larch last, that minister, amongst other observations in regard to the claim, says,
"If Captain Blair considered that the ~fexican Government is
responsible for the disaster which his vessel suffered, he should
a pply directly to the department of war and marine, under whose
jurisdiction the Independencia is. If that department admits the
responsibility of the Government in the matter, all difficulties will
at once disappear," and the same sentiment is reiterated by l\fr.
Fernandez in his note to you of the 15th ultimo. With reference
to these suggestions I have only to remark that the claim in question is presented by the Government in behalf of its injured citizen through the ordinary and only recognized channels of communication between it and that of l\Iexico, and if by the laws or
administrative regulations of that Republic it is made essential
that the facts should be first investigated by the ministry of war
and marine, it is conceived that the subject should be referred to
that department by the minister of foreign affairs. Such would
be the course pursued by this Government were a similar demand
to be made upon it by that of l\Iexico. You will at as early a day
as may be convenient bring these suggestions to the attention of
the :Mexican minister of foreign affairs, and you will say at the
same time that, upon a careful examination of the facts, this Department reached the conclusion that the 1\Iexican Government
was properly responsible for the damages resulting from the disaster in question, and that the hope is entertained that the minister will see the propriety and equity of an early adjustment of.
the claim.
I am, etc.,
FRED'K T. FRELINGHUYSEN.
(U. S. Foreign Relations, 1884, p. 343.)

On February 21, 1885, the schooner Lanie Oobb, of
Bangor, ~1aine, while in the harbor of La Guayra, was
run down by the Ana Eulogia, a vessel under commission
of the Venezuelan Government. Secretary Bayard, writing to the United States representative in Venezuela after
it had been found difficult to obtain any redress for damages, said:
At the time of the accident the Ana Eulogia was under commission of the Venezuelan Go\ernment, and that Government by
~5114-08--3
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every ren~oning is re:-:vonsible for the damage to the Lanie Cobb
on ae~ount of the careless and inexcusable acts of those on board
the former vessel. \Vhile, as previously stated, President Crespo's
ownership ought not to have any effect in aggraxating damages,
yet his high offire plar·es him in a position in which he must be
personally coguiimnt of the injury done and peculiarly sensitive as
to its redress. ( U. S. Foreign Rein tions, 1885, p. 925.)

An act of Congress provided in the case of the steamship Fo.~colia, which 'yas in collision 'vith the United
States stean1er Oolurnbia.·
Thn t the clailn of the owners of the British stea1nship Foscolia,
sunk by <·ollision with the United States steamship Columbia on
the en~ning of ~Iny twenty-eight, eighteen hundred nnd ninetyeight, nea1· Fire Island light-ship, for and on account of the loss
of said vessel and cargo, may be submitted to the United States
d!strict court for the s~)uthern district of New York, under and in
compliance with the rules of said court sitting as a court of admirnlty; and said court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine and to render judgment thereupon: Provided, however, '.rhat
the investigation of said claim shall be made upon the following
basis: First, the said court shall find the facts attending the loss
of the said steamship .u~oscolia and her cargo; and, second, if it
shnll appear that the responsibility therefor rests with the United
States stean1ship Columbia, the court shall then ascertain and
determine the amounts which should be paid to the owners, respectively, of the Foscolia and her cargo, in order to reimburse
them for the losses so sustained, and shall render a decree accordingly: Provided f'ltrther, That the amounts of the losses sustained
by the master, officers, and crew of the Foscolia may be included
in such decree.
That should such decree be rendered in favor of the owners of
the Foscolia and her cargo, the amount thereof may be paid out
of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated.
(United States Statutes at Large, 57th Congress, 1901-1903, Vol.
32, part 1, p. 242.)

The case of the F oscolia is stated as follows:
On the 28th of l\fay, 1898, about 7.45 o'clock, p. m., a collision
occurred, in a fog, about 12 miles southerly and westerly from
Fire Island light-ship, between the U. S. cruiser Coluntbia and the
British steamship F'oscolia, a freighter owned by the libellants,
which resulted in the total loss of the latter, with all of the cargo
on board and the greater part of the stores and of the persona!
effects of the crew. (123 Federal Reporter, 105.)

Claims were made t<> recover $226,889.36.
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'fhe United States adn1itted that the 0 olumbia did not
sho\v lights and was sounding no fog signals on account
of the existence of a state of war.
The court decided that under the act of Congress the
Foscolia \vas entitled to da1nages, eYen though the commander of the 0 olu1nbia 1night be acting under orders.
In this case the libellants took action to ascertain the
a1nount of damages only by authority of an act of Congress.
C1ollision between United States naval a1txilia1·y collier
and vessel in forei,qn harbor.-The Hongkong Daily Press
of July 5, 1906, giYes a sun1n1ary of the case of the
U. S. N. collier Alexanrle'r:
That case was one of in pcrsonwn against Captain Gove, of
the U. S. S. Alexander, clain1ing from him personal damages for
the loss alleged to ha Ye been sustained by the collision all.eged
to have occurred between the Alexander and the plaintiff's junk
iu the waters of tbe harbor. The first consiueration for his lordship was, the Ale..cander was a public artned yessel, the property
of a frienuly nation, the United States of America. This ship at
the time the collision was said to have occurred was in the
waters of the colony on the implied invitation of tbe sovereign
of the British Empire. r.rbat implied inYitation carried with it
the undertaking that a public armeu yessel of tlle Uniteu States
was free from the jurisdiction of that court so long as she demeaned herself in a friendly way within the jurisdiction. He
took it that it would not be denied by his learned friend that as
such an armed ship was free from all suits in the colony. It
was necessary to establish that proposition because he wished to
argue that the exemption afforded to the ship covered h'er as a
unity, as an entity, covered her not merely as so much steel, but
in her capacity as a public armed ship. One of the reasons for
the immunity of a public armed ship, part of the military and
naval force of a friendly nation, was so as not to interfere with
her efficiency. As far as the hull went, it was free from arrest,
and his learned friend, being well aware of that, did not go to
the court for a warrant for the ship's arrest. The assumption
was that the United States was willing to do justice to foreigners
as well as to her own subjects, and the remedy for any person
who suffered from collision with one of her ships was through the
proper diploma tic channels. ~rhe immunity of ·a public armed
ship was not confined to her hull only, it extended to her
machinery, her guns (which were not a part of the ship), and to
her captain and crew. Take the captain and the crew out of the

36

AUXILIARY COLLIER IN FOREIGN HARBOR.

ship and she was reduced to the character of United States property, but she was no longer an armed ship, part of the military
and naval force, which that power had sent into Asiatic waters.
Take the guns out of her and the same remark applies, though,
the Alexander, being a collier, she would be less efficient without
her crew than without her guns. Taking her crew out of her
would render her inefficient to perform tbe services required of
her. How could they contend that that which would render
her still less efficient could be taken from her, could be made
liable to this jurisdictiou? We have in this colony a law,
which was repealed in England in 1861', which allows imprisonment for debt of the person of the debtor. A judgment
against the captain renders hin1 liable to be imprisoned if he
could not find the n1oney; the plaintiffs had the right to imprison the debtor.
The CHIEF JusTICE. Your proposition is not confined to Hongkong?
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL. Obviously not.
Proceeding, he said that the general principle was that tbey
must do nothing to interfere Ydth the efficiency of the ship or
the purpose for which she was sent to those waters by a foreign
sovereign. Captain Gove had come here from Shanghai out of
respect for the jurisdiction of this court and the ship had gone
to sea 'Yitbout a captain. That was a serious interference with
the domestic economy of the ship, an interference with her efficiency. I-Iis lordship had before him an affidavit -from the officer
in co nun and of the station to the effect that he had received telegraphic orders that Captain Gove was to rejoin his ship as soon
as he could get away. 'l'he captain of the Alexander could not
bt:"' used as if he were the captain of an American merchant ship.
The CHIEF JusTICE. Does the question of extraterritoriality
come into it? Actions may be brought against foreign governments.
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL. If they submit.
~Jr. Slade argued that a foreign man-of-war was in the same
position as a British man-of-war. Supposing a ship of war engaged on important state duty ran down any \essel, if the officer
in charge of her set foot on shore he might be sen·ed with a writ
and become immediately subject to the jurisdiction of that court.
It was suggested in that case that Captain Gove was acting in the
course of his duty as captain of the Yessel that ran down the
junk. Their allegation was that he was not acting properly in
;command, that he was not doing his duty as a ser\ant of his
state. They alleged that he had been guilty of neglect. If they
admitted there was neglect the plaintiffs had no case. They
said the captain was not doing his duty as he ought to ha\e
done. Therefore the com1nands of his sovereign could not a vail
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him. His orders were to proceed with all due and proper care
fro1n the side of the U. S. S. Baltimore, then anchored at Kowloon
Bay. He in fact disobeyed these orders, and by his negligence
injures the plaintiffs.
The attorney-general said there was no allegation of neglect in
the writ.
1\fr. Slade said the writ was in the usual form. Continuing, he
said that when an action was brought against a British warship
and judgment given, the dmnages were recovered from the captain personally, and he submitted that the captain of a foreign
warship could not be in a better position than the captain of a
British warship.
Tlle attorney-general pointed out that the difference between
the captain of a British warship and the captain of a foreign
warRbip was that the former was always within the jurisdiction
of the British courts. The King's writs ran in all the King's
ships.
' The Chief Justice reserved his judgment.

The above-mentioned case vvas brought to the supreme
court, Admiralty jurisdiction, _Hongkong, China, against
Captain Gove, who commanded the U. S. naval auxiliary
Alexander. The Alexander had coaled the U. S. S. Baltirnore, and "when leaving the latter's side to proceed to
her anchorage" collided ·with the junk, Tung On Tai. A
naval board of inquiry placed the blame on the junk.
. The owners of the junk brought suit under the civil law
against the master of the Alexander. On request the
governor of Hongkong directed the Crown la,vyers to
conduct the case in behalf of the 'lTnited States. The
judgment in this case involves several conclusions of sufficient importance to "Tarrant reproduction in full, particularly as such decisions are not under ordinary circumstances easily accessible.
The chief justice, Sir Francis Piggott, said:
In this case the attorney-general moved on behalf of the
Crown at the instance of the Governtnent of the United States to
dismiss an action brought in the Admiralty jurisdiction of this
court by the owners of the junk Tung On Tai and the owners of
her cargo against Arthur E. Gove, the commander of th~ U. S. S.
Alexander in respect of a collision which occurred in the waters
of the harbour. 'l,he Alexander is an armed public -ressel, the
pr-operty of the Government of the United States. The commander
was in the service and pay of that Government and under the con-
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trol of the Secretary of the Kavy -of the United States. At the
pm·iod of collision he was employed in active service conveying
coal and other stores for the use of the public vessels of the
"Cuited States Governn1ent on the East Asiatic Station and at the
a etual time of collision he was in conunand of the ship engaged
on such service. The ground of the attorney-general's protest is
teat the court has no jurisdiction to entertain this action, this
nwthod of proceeding being based upou the course pursued by the
Admiralty adYocate in the case of the Constitution. The circumstances of this case are, howeYer, different, for whereas the suit
conunenced in the case of the Constitution was in rem for salYage
services, this suit is in personant, i. e., against the comtnander
for dan1ages in respect of a collision caused by his alleged neglig.~nt navigation.
It is not, so far as I know, settled that the
principle that ships of war belonging to a nation with whom this
C'ountry is at peace, are exempt from the civil jurisdiction of our
courts, applies to the commanders of snch ships when, in hH
alleged negligent performance of their duties, they cause damage
which under other circumstances \vould render them liable to an
action.
The exterritoriality of foreign ships of war was considered at
length in the case of the Parlentent Belge, and in the course of
the judgment there are certain dicta which seem, though not in
so many word~, to warrant the proposition for which the learned
attorney-general contended, namely, this exterritoriality of the
warships extenlled in smne measure to her officers and crew. If
these dicta do bear this extension the commander of the Alexander could not be sued for acts committed by him in the course
of the performance of his duty. These dicta are as follows:
"Has the Admiralty division juriHliction in respect of a collision
to proceed in rem aga in~t a ship w11ich is at the tin1e of the proceedings the property of a foreign sovereign, is in the possession,
control, and employ of the soYereign by means of his commis·
sioned officers and is a public vessel of his state?" Again : "The
first question rPally raises this, ·whether any part of the public
property of any sovereign authority in use for national purposes
is not as much exempt from the jurisdiction of any court as is
the person of eYery sovereign." . And ngain : "A public armed
ship constitutPs a part of the auxiliaQ~ force of a nation, acts
under the immediate and direct command of the sovereign, is
emplo3~efl by hiln in national objects. He has n1any and po\verful
inotiYes for preventing those objects from being defeated by the
interference of a foreign state. Ruch interference cannot take
place without affecting his power and dignity." And finally:
" The point and force of this argument in t)le Prinz Ji'rederilc is
that the public property of eYery sovereign state, being destined
to public use, cannot \Yith reason be submitted to the jurisdiction
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of courts of such states, because such jurisdiction, if exercised,
nmst divert the public property from its destined public use, and
that by international comity, which provides for the equality of
f-::tates, lf such immunity, grounded ~n such reasons, exists in each
state with regard to its own public property, the same immunity
must be granted by each state to similar property of all other
states."
We may include with very little stretch of language in the
term ''property of the state" the services of its paid officers,
and the different propositions given in this judgment, together
with the reasons, seem, as I have said, to cover the question of
a collision by the alleged negligence of the commander of a state
vessel and show that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain
a personal action for damages. I use the word" cover" advisedly,
for it may be that if they were applied without limitation to the
personnel of this foreign vessel they would be far too wide.
Before, therefore, I can hold this to be the law, there is a
question to be considered which indeed lies on the surfacewhy, if the principle does apply to the officers and crew of a
public ship, does it not apply to all cases, for the attorneygeneral's contention was limited to actions resulting from the performance of duties; whereas the principles abo\e stated, if they
apply to the officers and c~·ew, are wide enough to cover all
cases, for in all cases the result of bringing this action will be to
'vithdra w the defendant from the efficient performance of his
official dutie~ and so interfere with the fighting efficiency of his
ship. Secondly, there is the very ingenious point raised by the
plaintiff's counsel, based on the whole, and especially on the concluding, words of the last quotation given fron1 the judgment in
the Parle1nent Belge. "By international comity, if such immunity, grounded on such reasons, exist in each state with regard
to its own public property, the same immunity must be granted
by each state to similar property of all other states." Thus,
co.ncludes the learned counsel, seeing that the immunity claimed
for the con1mander of the Alr>xandcr does not exist in England
with regard to commanders of our own puhlic ships, it can not be
l't:!Cognized as applicable to the commanders of foreign public
ships. It is admitted that the commander of a British ship may
be sued in an action such as the present, the principle enunciated
by Lushington in the A~hol case and acted on in subsequent cases
being that in case of tort or damage committed by vessels of the
Crown the vessels can not be touched, but the le~al responsibility
attaches to the actual wrongdoer only.
The proposition advanced. though, as I say. very ingenious,
inYolves a non-sequitur~· for admitting that the same immunity
n1ust be granted as is granted to sin1ilar property owned by any
state, non constat it may not grant a larger immunity to such
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property when belonging to a foreign state. I think, with very
great re~pect, the principle deduced by L. J. Brett from the decision of the Prinz Frederik needs some amplification and explanation. WhateYer the rule applicable to such a case as the
present may be, there can be no question that it depends upon
the comity which nations observe in their relations with one
another. But comity depends upon mutual concessions between
such states, and though it may be perfectly true that some of the
rules which depend upon comity deal with subjects which are
dealt with by the municipal laws of states under analogous circumstances and dealt with moreover by such laws in an identical
or similar fashion, it by no means follows that the n1ethods and
principles adopted by the municipal law form the criterion of
the methods and principles which ought to be adopterl when a
case, which de11ends on a comity, comes for decision. l\Iany cases
dealt with by con1ity n1uch resemble cases dealt with b~y municipal law, but beyond this it is not safe to go. There is an imnlunity which hedges the sovereignty-by English municipal law
this takes the form of maxin1s. "The king can do no wrong."
Statutes do not bind the Crown without express reference, but
there is no surh maxim as " Kings can do no wrong." Foreign
sovereigns are exem11t fron1 the jurisdiction of our courts, been use the exercise of such jurisdiction is inconsistent with the
independence of their sovereignty, the fundamental principle of
comity being the equality of independent states. Or, to take the
conYerse case, there is no ~uch rule at all in the French codes.
Is it to be doubted that the King of England is exempt in France
from the jurisdiction of the French courts? This illustration is
sufficient to explain what I have just said. Other illustrations
could, I belieYe, be found, but it is sufficient to say that so far as
the rules of comity have become concrete they are based entirely
on the mutual recognition of an equal independence, each refraining from acting so as to interfere with that sovereign's independence, and so far as they have not yet become concrete the
mutual recognition, when a case arises for decision, is of the
spirit of the law, rather than of its actual proyisions-jus for
jus, not lex for lex. In this I see no possibility of reference in
determining what action is to be taken in any given circumstances
by any state when its own sovereign or its public service is
concerned.
I therefore think that the plaintiff's contention can not ue
maintained, and that the principles enunciated in the Parlcment
Belge, as applicable to foreign public ships certainly cover tile
case of the officers and crew on board, because they are under
the control and employ of a foreign sovereign in national objects
and because the jurisdiction of this court, if exercised, must
divert their public service from its distinct public use. I may
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refer in this connection to the New Chili Gold Mining Company
v. Blanco ( 4 Times Law Reports, 346), when the court refused
to allow a writ to issue out of the jurisdiction in an action to
be brought against the ambassador accredited to the French
Government. The judge differed as to the ground of refusal,
but it being a matter of discretion the then chief justice said
that the court ought not to call upon a foreign ambassador in
a foreign country to leave his post and come over to this country.
It would interfere with the duties he had to discharge. This I
believe to be a sound doctrine, but it is clear that so far the
proposition is too widely stated for this case, for unless it t>e
limited in some way, as the learned attorney-general suggests,
in law it arrived at something which, as stated, is not far removed from complete exterritoriality of foreign naval officers,
putting it on a par in all respects with the exterritoriality of
their vessel. 'l'here is complete exterritoriality of ambassadors,
but that is a case in which the rule of comity (expressed in
statutory form in England) has taken concrete form. But it is
clear that the case of naval officers has not yet taken such form,
for there is no authority that I know of laying down what their
immunity is. It is, I think, equally clear that no state has ever
claimed such a complete im1nunity except in case of acts committed on board ~hip, but on the contrary that when their ships
are in foreign waters all states recognize the necessity for their
officers, while on shore, conforn1ing to tbe municipal laws, and
that they 1nake no elaim for their surrender in case of breach
of such laws, even though the result should be to withdraw
them from thelr military sen·ice. This same principle applies,
of course, to civil actions. This certainly supports the suggestion that the immunity is limited to acts done whHe in performance of their duty.
In order to make the analysis as complete as I am able, let us
assume that while steering a n1an-of-war's gig during a regatta,
at which the officers and sailors on board were only taking part
as spectators, the officer in charge so negligently nayigated as to
run down a sampan, causing its owner dan1age, I do not believe
in such a case any Governn1ent would act as in this case the
United States Government bas felt it its duty to act and ask
for the action to be disn1issed, and yet the san1e dicta of the
court in the Parlernent Belge might have been pressed into this
service. The common law furnishes instances of analogous cases,
where masters ba ve been held not liable for the negligence of
their servants, although the negligent act was committed while
the servant was driving his master's carriage, because the servant
had gone off the route of duty for a diversion of his own. This
analogy seems to warrant this limitation to the naval officer's
immunity, which was, in fact, suggested by the learned attorney-
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general, and that it exists only so long as he forms a part of the
machine known as a Yessel of war and commits this act of negligence with and by n1eans of such Yessel and when it is in whole
or in part under his control. But whether such immunity can be
claimed by the officer himself I Yery much doubt. For these
reasons the motion of the attorney-general must be sustained and
the action dismissed with costs.

rrhis decision establishes the imlnunity before foreign
courts of officers engaged in the naval service "Then acting
in the line of duty.
1"'he decision ~ecognizes as a public officer the 1naster
of a collier engaged in the public service under the appointn1ent of the Secretary of the K a vy.
''Thteher such a Inaster 'vould be a public officer in the
sense of the United States statutes is not a matter for a
foreign court to decide. His action so far as the foreign stat~ is concerned is the action of a public official of
the United States. For this action the TJnited States is
responsible.
:Xo suit can therefore be had against the master of the
vessel.
This late decision is in accord with the principles that
have been deYeloping for n1any years and in accord 'vith
earlier decisions so far as applicable.
Status of United States auxiliary 1.:e8sels.-By the
Regulations for the N aYal ~l.uxiliary Srrvice, approved
to go into effect April 1, 1907, Chapter I 1. The na Yal auxiliary service as hereby organized will include such transports, supply Yessels, colliers, and other ves8cls
as may be assigned to it by the Department.
2. These vessels shall be governed by the laws of the United
States, by the NaYy Regulations as far a~ they may be applicable,
and by these regulations.

Thus the naval auxiliary service is directly recognized
as an ann of the X avy Departinent, and if thus recognized by the United States, foreign states cannot question
the fact that such vessels are public vessPls.
The GoYernment has also prescribed the course of action for co1nmanders of vessels of the United States in
case of collision.
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Regulations in regard to collisions.-There should be
immediate action in accord with the Regulations for the
Navy, 1905, article 422:
(1) In the e-rent of a collision between a ship of the Navy and
a merchant Yessel, so serious, or under such circumstances as not
to admit of immediate repair with the resources at hand, and
therefore likely to involve damages, the captain shall order a
board of three officers to ascertain all the attendant circumstances, injuries recei-red by the merchant -resse1, probable
amount of damages, and which of the ships is responsible for the
accident; and the master of the merchant Yessel concerned shall
be notified of the time and place of the meeting of the board and
informed that the officers and men of his 'Vessel will be given a
hearing by the board, if such hearing is desired. The report
shall be prepared in triplicate; one copy shall be forwarded without delay to the com1nander in chief for the Secretary of the
Navy, one retained by the captnin of the ship, and the remaining
copy giYen to the master of the merchant vessel, provided that
the officers and crew thereof who were witnesses to the collision
shall ha-re testified before the board. 'Vhen repairs llave been
effected on the spot, a certificate to that effect shall be taken
fron1 the 1naster of the merchant yessel and forwarded, through
that commander in chief, to the Secretary of the NaYy.
(2) If in the presence of a senior officer, the facts shall be immediately reported to him, and he shall order the board.
(3) If the collision occurs in the waters of the United States
and results in the loss of life or damage to person or property,
the captain shall inforn1 the collector of the district in which it
occurs, in accordance with the act of June 20, 1874 (United States
Laws relating to the :KaYy and ::\Iarine Corps, 1898, page 136) .a
a A law of June 20, 1874, requires that.-after July 1, 1874, "whenever
any vessel of the United States bas sustained or caused any
accident involving the loss of life, the material loss of property, or
any seriom:; injury to any person, or bas received any material damage
affecting her seaworthiness or her efficiency, the managing owner, agent,
or master of sucll vessel shall within five days after the happening of
such accident or damage, or as soon thC'rcafter as possible, send, by letter
to the collector of customs of the district wherein such vessel belongs
or of that within which such accident or damage occurred, a report
thereof, signed by such owner, agent, or master, stating the name and
official number (if any) of the vessel, the port to which she belongs, the
place where she was, the nature and probable occasion of the casualty,
the number and names of those lost, and the probable amount of the
loss or damage to the vessel or cargo ; and shall furnish, upon the request
of either of such collectors of customs, such other information concerning the vessel, her cargo, and the casualty as may be called for; and
if he neglect or refuse to comply with the foregoing requirement after
a reasonable time, he shall incur a penalty of one hundred dollars."
(18 Statutes at Large, chap. 344, §10.)

.
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( 4) He shall, if the collision occurs in a foreign port, take such
measures as may be required by the port regulations, informing
the captain of the port, should it be necessary.
( 5) The foregoing provisions of this article shall apply, as far
as practicable, in all cases of collision by a ship of the Navy with
a wharf, float, or other object.
(G) \\"'henever, in consequence of injuries sustained in a foreign port by a United States vessel, as a result of a collision between it and a foreign merchant vessel, clearly the fault of the
latter, it may become necessary or desirable, on the part of the
contmanding officer of the vessel, to libel the latter vessel, such
libel proceedings shall be instituted in the natue of the United
States, and not in the name of such contmanding officer. In all
such cases it shall be the duty of the commanding officer concerned, or of the senior officer present, according to circumstances,
immediately to inform the Department of his action.

Resume.-The situation under consideration is as follows:
A United States auxiliary collier contmantled by an officer

appointed by the Secretary of the :Xavy is in a harbor of State
X. The collier collides with and injures a foreign vessel. The
owner of the foreign vessel brings suit against tlle contmander of
the collier for damages under the civil law, claiming that the
status of the collier is uncertain, and that the commander would
in any case be liable as would the con1mander of a ship of the
State X, the cotnmanders of whose vessels, public and private,
are liable in the civil courts of that state, under similar circumstances.

The fact that the commanding officer is appointed by
the Secretary of the Navy rather than under the usual
commission is not a 1natter of which any foreign state may
properly take cognizance, provided his conduct is regulated by government orders and provided the government
is responsible for his action. In this case, so far as the
foreign state is concerned, the auxiliary collier is a vessel
of the United States Navy and is therefore a public vessel. The precedents, opinions, and regulations show that
public vessels are not subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign state in such a situation as is under consideration.
The recent Regulations for the Naval Auxiliary Service of the United States make such a vessel as an auxiliary collier a part of the naval force to be governed by
the Navy Regulations as far as these may be applicable.
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These Regulations for 1905 provide, article 422, for the
course of action in cases of collision.
The aim as set forth in precedents, opinions, and regulations is not to make it possible for the state which they
represent to avoid responsibility for acts of public vessels
while in a foreign harbor, but rather to avoid complications which might follow if a public vessel is detained
during the period of suit before a court.
In order not to interfere with the action of a public
vessel and at the same time not to deprive the owner of
the foreign vessel which had been in collision of any just
compensation for damages, it has become common and
in general seems to have worked satisfactorily to present
claims through the regular diplomatic channels. Accordingly, the action of the responsible officer should be
determined by the above considerations.
0 onclusion.-The senior officer, acting in accordance
with principle, precedent, and regulations, should appoint a board of inquiry and maintain that the suit
should not be brought against the master of the auxiliary collier, but that the claims should be referred to the
United States Government through d!plomatic channels.

